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Pages 32 - 42, incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE  
Reference: SWNCC 304/3

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for Special Studies and Evaluations in response to the above reference, is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

H. W. MOSELEY

W. A. SCHULGEN

V. L. LOWRANCE

Secretariat

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*approved 23 Oct. '47*

OSD, DOS reviews completed

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ENCLOSURE

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Report by the  
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee  
for Special Studies and Evaluations

THE PROBLEM

1. To study and report, and specifically to make recommendations upon which a reply may be based to the request to the Navy Department from the Director, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, for any information that may properly be given out concerning psychological warfare in World War II, with special reference to illustrations of its successful employment in bringing about the surrender of Japan and of enemy European countries; to study and report on whether information on the existence and transactions of the Subcommittee concerning psychological warfare can be presented to a member of Congress under safe security in relation to the bill on this subject which it is understood this member is preparing for introduction into the Congress.

ASSUMPTION

2. The establishment of an organization or organizations or facilities for psychological warfare by legislative action would entail hearings on this subject before Congressional committees related to such purposes, under security procedure.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

3. Reference is made to paragraph 8 b of the Charter (Appendix "A", SWNCC 304/1, 304/2):

"The Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare shall: ...b. Maintain close liaison with the appropriate policy offices of the State, War and Navy Departments and with authorized coordinating agencies of other departments of the Government of the United States".

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4. The Office of War Information was established by Executive Order 9182 dated 13 June 1942 and amended on 10 March 1943. The Office of Strategic Services was established by Military Order on 13 June 1942. Both established organizations and procedures for the application of certain aspects of psychological warfare. Both agencies were terminated after the conclusion of hostilities, and certain of their activities transferred to the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.

5. No national organization for psychological warfare other than the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for Special Studies and Evaluations has been established.

#### CONCLUSIONS

6. The information (Appendix) which can be provided the Director, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, at this time, although limited, will be of value as background to the subject.

7. Legislation introduced into Congress providing for psychological warfare activities should have the advantage of recourse to the factors underlying the studies now being carried on by the Subcommittee and should be in reasonable consonance so far as possible with the objectives outlined in SWNCC 304/1 and 304/2.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended that:

- a. The conclusions above be approved.
- b. The Department of the Navy transmit to the Director, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, the information contained in the Appendix, which is declassified for this purpose.
- c. SWNCC authorize the Chairman of the Subcommittee for Special Studies and Evaluations to convey to a member of Congress, under strict security, the frame of reference under which the Subcommittee studies are being carried on,

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the essential facts of the Charter (SWNCC 304/1 and 304/2), and the objectives to which the studies of the Subcommittee are being addressed. This information to be communicated orally to a member of Congress as indicated in the foregoing within the extent and limits of a written draft to be approved by the Subcommittee.

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A P P E N D I X

Dr. S. Arthur Devan  
Legislative Reference Section  
The Library of Congress

Dear Doctor Devan:

In response to your letter of 1 August 1947 concerning psychological warfare in the recent war the following information is related;

The United States organization for psychological warfare in World War II was affected by the following developments:

11 July 1941. The Office of Coordinator of Information (COI) was established by Presidential Order to collect, analyze, and correlate information and data available to the President and such other officials as determined by the President, and to perform related activities. COI commenced operations on the premise that this agency would not only coordinate all incoming information, but also information flowing from the United States to the rest of the world. The Foreign Information Service was organized as a separate branch of COI, was situated in New York City, and was charged with the responsibility of coordinating international broadcasting from this country.

30 July 1941. The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) was created by Executive Order. This office was an outgrowth of the Office for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations Between the American Republics, created by the Council of National Defense on 16 August 1940. CIAA was assigned broad functions as coordination center of commercial and cultural relations with other American republics, and was responsible for furthering commercial and economic well-being in the Western Hemisphere.

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30 July 1941. The Board of Economic Warfare (BEW) was established (originally as the Economic Defense Board) by Executive Order for the purpose of developing and coordinating policies, plans, and programs designed to protect and strengthen the international economic relations of the United States in the interest of national defense. (Eventually BEW was consolidated into the Foreign Economic Administration.)

26 October 1941. The Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) was created by Executive Order for the purpose of facilitating dissemination of factual information to the citizens of this country on the progress of defense efforts and on the defense policy and activities of the government.

3 March 1942. There was created a joint psychological warfare committee which was envisaged as the ultimate authority over psychological warfare operations. With the progress of the war, the rapidly changing situation, and the extending of psychological warfare operations, this committee's functions later were absorbed by other agencies.

13 June 1942. The Office of War Information (OWI) was established by Executive Order of the President for the purpose of coordinating into one agency war information functions of the government--foreign and domestic. The Executive Order brought the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) into the new agency, and abolished the Office of Coordinator of Information (COI), exclusive of the Foreign Information Service which was transferred to OWI.

13 June 1942. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was established by Military Order under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the purpose of collecting and analyzing such strategic information as required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for military operations in planning and in conducting special operations not assigned to other government agencies.

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10 March 1943. The President issued the following clarifying order with respect to the responsibilities of OWI and OSS:

"The Office of War Information will plan, develop, and execute all phases of the federal program of radio, press, publication, and related foreign propaganda activities involving the dissemination of information. The program for foreign propaganda in areas of actual or projected military operations will be coordinated with military plans through the planning agencies of the War and Navy Departments, and shall be subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Parts of the foreign propaganda program which are to be executed in a theater of military operations will be subject to the control of the theater commander. The authority, functions, and duties of the Office of War Information shall not extend to the Western Hemisphere, exclusive of the United States and Canada.

"The military order of June 13, 1942, establishing the Office of Strategic Services, is hereby modified to the extent necessary to make this order effective."

17 March 1943. The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized liaison officers for the War and Navy Departments with duties as follows:

To sit as members of the Overseas Planning Group of OWI.

To maintain contact with all planning agencies of the JCS and to furnish the Overseas Planning Group of the Office of War Information with appropriate plan information and guidance and as necessary to insure correlation between military and propaganda plans.

To transmit requests from JCS to OWI relative to propaganda activities desired for the purpose of furthering military operations.

To present to the JCS all propaganda plans which required their approval.

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The foregoing directives, in their successive steps, formulated the government's policy with respect to information and foreign propaganda, and established organizations designed to provide for coordinated planning and implementation of foreign propaganda and foreign secret operations. With respect to information, various governmental agencies operated to inform the United States public of our progress in the war. These agencies were subject to voluntary censorship and to cable and postal censorship. With regard to foreign propaganda and foreign secret operations, governmental organizations operated to overcome the enemy's will to fight and to sustain the morale of friendly groups in countries occupied by the enemy. In addition, there was an attempt, divided between information and propaganda agencies, to improve the morale of friendly countries and the attitudes of neutral countries toward the United States.

Foreign propaganda and foreign secret operations were directed so as to discredit the enemy's government and leaders, to stimulate divisions between dissident enemy persons and groups, to persuade the enemy military and enemy civilian population of the hopelessness of their situation, and to meet the enemy propaganda with counter-propaganda.

Directives outlined above eventually resulted in the following procedure within the organizations dealing with phases of psychological warfare:

Coordination between OSS and OWI was on a basis of informal cooperation. Approval of OSS and OWI plans for military theaters of operation or projected operations was vested in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In military theaters, coordination was conducted through the normal military command channels.

The Army and Navy conducted psychological warfare operations, partially through OSS and OWI agencies, and partially through their own organizations. Agencies for psychological

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warfare operations were developed in all theaters of operations, usually on the basis of a special staff section of the theater commander's staff, which maintained close liaison with the intelligence section. In addition, field operating teams for front-line combat psychological warfare were employed by the armed services. OWI and OSS personnel in military theaters were nominally integrated into the military organization, which assumed responsibility for their logistical support.

The CIAA operated semi-independently, with "information" measures designed to improve economic and commercial interests between the United States and the countries of Central and South America.

The United States has a history of unpreparedness for wartime use of psychological warfare. The skillful employment of this weapon is a realistic undertaking. The Armed Services have a vital interest in psychological warfare in time of war, not as a substitute for combat but as a form of warfare which has proven itself to be a valuable auxiliary in weakening and ending enemy resistance during periods of armed conflict.

There follow a few notable examples of qualitative effectiveness of psychological warfare in World War II:

As the Allies moved northward from Africa, the Commander at Italy's Island of Pantelleria was given leaflet instructions to surrender by displaying a white flag and white crosses. He followed these instructions, even before the Allied landing forces approached. Over 7,000,000 leaflets were dropped in Sicily prior to its invasion. Sixty-five of the first hundred enemy soldiers to surrender were waving leaflets, the majority of these having hidden them in their boots to avoid severe punishment by their officers.

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When the Italian fleet was in the balance, its commander was given instructions by radio on where and how to proceed to join the "victorious" forces of liberation. These instructions were followed to the letter.

In Italy, false posted orders appeared behind the German lines apparently emanating from German Commanders and instructing German forces to retire to pre-determined positions. As a result of these "orders" there was considerable confusion among German Commands, and actual retirements of German forces, before Kesselring was able to effect neutralizing measures.

As the Allies closed in on the Japanese homeland, our radio and leaflet efforts were stepped up. Combined with the psychological attack on the Japanese masses, radio efforts were directed specifically to reach Japanese Statesmen with suggestions of a method of surrender acceptable to the Japanese psychological pattern. Information analyzed since the end of combat operations, based on interviews with Japanese governmental leaders, tends to validate the strong influence of the latter appeal in precipitating surrender.

In April 1945, Radio Berlin acknowledged that allied psychological warfare had "influenced the military decision by sapping Germany's strength".

A comprehensive history of Psychological Warfare in World War II is now being prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will provide an extensive evaluation of the results of psychological warfare efforts.

A selected bibliography of material related to psychological warfare is appended.

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ANNEX TO APPENDIX

Selected Bibliography

Psychological Warfare

- BASCHWITZ, Kurt      Der Massenwahn  
(no Eng. translation May 1947)  
Note: Exposition of why the Germans were hated.  
Good discussion of mass delusion.
- BRUNTZ, George G.      Allied Propaganda & the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918.  
London: H. Milford, Oxford Univ. Press 1938, also Stanford 1938.  
Note: Fully documented study of the use made by the Allied powers of the instruments of propaganda in World War I & of its destructive effects upon German morale. Bibliography, index, scholarly objectivity - critically selected bibliography.
- CANTRILL, Hadley      Psychology of <sup>Social</sup> ~~Special~~ Movements.  
Note: basic study of social psychology.
- CREEL, George      How We Advertised America  
N.Y. & London: Harper Bros., 1920.  
Note: account of American propaganda effort within the U.S. during World War I as related by the chairman of the Committee on Public Information.
- DOOB, Leonard W.      Propaganda: Its Psychology & Technique.  
Holt & Co., 1935.  
Note: teacher of social psychology at Yale, uses scientific analysis method. Basic scientific study of propaganda from an applied psychological point of view. Covers definitions, forms, practical applications, etc. Doob has written what is probably the most satisfactory general treatise on propaganda in contemporary life. This work, together with the works of Cantrill, LeBon & Lasswell listed in this selected bibliography, is considered to be of great value.
- DRABOVITCH, Waladimir      La Fragilite de la Liberte et la Seduction des Dictatures.  
(Spanish translation but no Eng. translation May 1947.)
- GILLETTE, Francis      Methods of Psychological Warfare.  
Fort Leavenworth, 1942.  
Note: short symposium by an instructor of the Command & General Staff School of the U.S. Army on propaganda in World War II, especially German propaganda.

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Annex to Appendix

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- KORZYBSKI, Alfred H.     Science & Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems & General Semantics (2nd ed. Lancaster, Pa., The Science Press Printing Co., 1941).  
Note: see introductory remarks in 2nd ed. Nazi "War on Nerves", etc.
- LASSWELL, Harold     Propaganda Technique in the World War. P. Smith, reprinted 1938.  
Note: important work in which the scientific implications of propaganda are treated in conjunction with the analysis of propaganda techniques.
- LASSWELL, Harold  
CASEY, Ralph  
SMITH, B. L.     Propaganda & Promotional Activities: An Annotated Bibliography.  
Univ. of Minneapolis, 1935.  
Note: History, use, technique, organization, symbols, styles & channels of propaganda. Indispensable handbook for workers in this field; and its sequel,
- SMITH, Bruce L.     Propaganda, Communication & Public Opinion, A Comprehensive Reference Guide.  
Princeton 1946.  
Note: Comprehensive annotated bibliography on propaganda, communication & public opinion, including books, pamphlets, & articles appearing between 1934 & 1943. Also 4 chapters on the science of mass communication. This bibliography is an extremely useful work in the growing field of opinion & communications research. It will be found to be an invaluable guide to the fields of promotion, public relations, publicity, news dissemination, and world affairs.
- LE BON, Gustave     Mass Psychology.  
Note: Classical study of crowd psychology. Original writer on mass psychology.
- STUART, Sir Campbell     Secrets of Crewe House.  
N.Y. & London: Hodder & Staughton 1920.  
Note: Stuart (Creel's counterpart in Great Britain) covers English propaganda operations in World War I.

Notes appearing after titles are intended to be informative only.  
Critical book reviews have been considered in making notes in some cases. In other cases comments of readers have been used.  
In any case the value of books or works listed should be judged from the book or work itself and not from an entered note.

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Annex to Appendix

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15 September 1947

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

CORRIGENDUM

TO

SWNCC 304/4

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Note by the Secretaries

Holders of SWNCC 304/4 are requested to make the following changes therein:

Page 41, Annex to Appendix, Third Item:

CANTRILL, Hadley Psychology of Social Movements,  
change "Special" to read "Social". ✓

H. W. MOSELEY

W. A. SCHULGEN

V. L. LOWRANCE

Secretariat

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